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I
There is still a relative paucity of discussion of the views on friendship 
that Aristotle presents in the Nicomachean Ethics,l although som e re­
cent work may indicate a new trend. One suspects that this paucity  
reflects a belief that those views are not very interesting; if true, this 
witnesses to an unfortunate underestimation of Aristotle's account. This 
account is in fact quite surprising, for — I shall argue — Aristotle be­
lieves that one makes one's friends in the most literal sense of the verb.
Aristotle takes virtue-friendship, i.e., the friendship of virtuous peo­
ple who are friends for virtue, as 'friendship in the primary w ay.' Other 
'friendships' -  for utility and for pleasure -  are only so-called by way  
of similarity to friendship proper, i.e ., virtue-friendship (1157a30ff). 
Accordingly, proper friendship must be non-instrum ental, or, more 
carefully, not essentially instrumental, unlike the friendship-analogs that 
fall outside the scope of friendship proper (1157al7-20). While 'friends 
°f utility...were never friends of each other, but of what was expedient 
for them' (1157al4ff), a true 'friend is taken to be som eone who wish-
I m grateful to Richard Kraut, Gregory Vlastos, and -  especially -  Jennifer Whiting 
for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as to the anonymous 
P  readers provided by this Journal.
References, unless otherwise indicated, are to the Nicomachean Ethics (NE); the 
translations are generally those of Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 1985). 
Throughout this paper, 'friendship,' 'love' and their cognates will be used to trans- 
ate philia' and its relatives. A review of the difficulties in translating the term 
can found in John Cooper, 'Aristotle on Friendship,' in A. Rorty, ed., Essays
0,1 Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1980) 301-40.
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es and does goods or apparent goods to his friend for the friend's own 
sake' (1166a3). The them e of desiring and acting for the friend's own 
sake is repeated many times in the Ethics; 2 in the Rhetoric it is explicit­
ly taken as definitive of friendship (1361b35-40). Since the contrast be­
tween true friendship and mere friendship-analogs is that between the 
not essentially instrumental (for the sake of the friend) and the essen­
tially instrumental (using the friend as a means to pleasure or utility), 
a successful account of Aristotle's views on friendship must preserve 
and explain this contrast in all its centrality.3
In doing so, one must be careful not to take friendship for virtue in 
such a way as to render friends a fungible com m odity.4 The problem 
is this. Aristotle believes that one loves a friend for his virtue (cf., e.g., 
1171320, 1156b6ff). But there are (one hopes) many virtuous people, 
and, indeed, many persons who are more virtuous than the friends
2 1155b31, 1156b7-10, 1159310, 1164a34, 1166a3, 1168a34, 1168b3; cf. also 1156al3.
3 Cooper, 'Aristotle on Friendship/ argues that pleasure- and utility-friendships 
have a substantial non-instrumental component. This is the point of distinguish­
ing between essentially instrumental friendships (that have non-instrumental fea­
tures, as in Cooper's example of the businessman who becomes willing to do small 
favors for a regular customer) and friendships that are essentially non-instrumental. 
Although Cooper's treatment tends to assimilate the different kinds of friend­
ships to one another (on this point, see also note 17), it is clear that utility- and 
pleasure-friendships fall on the essentially instrumental side of the divide. In sec­
tion V we will see a more principled way of spelling out the distinction between 
these and friendship for the sake of the friend.
So this is not to say that (true) friends don't have their uses. Aristotle is aware 
that friends have instrumental value (most notably at 1099a31-b2). The friend is 
a benefactor in the hour of need, and an opportunity for the exercise of virtue 
when fortune is generous (1155a5ff, 1169bll-16). At one point, Aristotle describes 
having friends as 'the greatest external good' (1169bl0), a characterization that 
may suggest to some instrumental rather than intrinsic value. It is thus worth 
recalling that Aristotle thinks that external goods (such as health) can have both 
intrinsic and instrumental value, and that the latter need not preclude the form­
er. See note 6.
4 Now it might be objected that while this is a natural way for us to understand 
friendship, it is not obviously so for Aristotle. Aristotle takes friends to love one 
another for virtue, and since one virtuous person is, qua virtuous person, like 
another, friends must be, as it were, a fungible commodity. Such a position con 
flicts so strongly with our pretheoretical understanding of friendship and wi 
the general tone of Aristotle's discussion of it that its only support can be our 
inability to find a preferred construal of the claim that one loves a friend 
virtue. As we shall see, an alternative is available. Moreover, this reading w 
be extremely hard put to solve the puzzle I am about to pose, i.e., to explain 
one loves just those virtuous people that one does love out of the many that on 
might.
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one actually has. If the friend's virtue provides the reason for the friend­
ship, it would seem that one has identical reason to love all virtuous 
persons, or, if this is not possible, to replace one's virtuous friends with 
still more virtuous persons. But it is som ething like a conceptual truth 
about friendship that one has relatively few friends (according to Aristo­
tle, roughly the number that one can live with — 1171al-3). A similar 
truth is that one does not rush off to replace one's som ew hat virtuous 
friends with still more virtuous acquaintances. Friends are not replace­
able: even w hen one loses old friends and makes new ones, it is not 
accurate to think of the new  as replacing the old; m oreover Aristotle 
takes virtuous friendship to be (pretty much) perm anent (1156bl8). 
There are many individuals who cannot claim the prerogatives of one's 
friendship, even though they m ay share in the admirable properties 
of those who can. This requires explanation. W hy does one (appropri­
ately) love one virtuous acquaintance rather than another? And why  
can one not simply replace a virtuous friend with some other, equally 
virtuous person?
II
With these constraints in mind, let's turn to Aristotle's account of friend­
ship. Certain Aristotelian expressions -  to the effect that one wishes 
goods to one's friend for his own sake, and that the friend is another 
self — appear too m any times to be dismissed as less than central.5 
It is worth trying to take them seriously, which — at the risk of stick­
ing to a stuffy notion of seriousness — suggests taking them  as literal­
ly as possible.
How are we to understand these expressions? The claim that the 
friend is another self suggests that the right w ay to do so is to think 
about one's own self. In one's ow n case, one has that special concern  
for one's projects and one's future that expresses itself in, among other 
things, prudence. This special concern is often felt to be one that ter­
minates justification: 'W hy do X?' can be answ ered by 'X is good for 
me/  whereas 'Why do what's good for you?' seems like a non-question. 
One way of putting this fact about us is to say that one desires the 
good for oneself for one's own sake (rather than for the sake of any­
thing else). W hen Aristotle says that the friend is another self, that 
one desires the good for one's friend for the friend's sake, Aristotle
5 For the former, see note 2. For the latter, 1166a30-33, 1166bl, 1169b6, 1170b6f, 
U71b33; cf. also 1171a20.
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is at least saying that one has for one's friend the sam e kind of special 
concern that one has for oneself, that the concern for the friend is 
justification-terminating in the same way that one's concern for one­
self is justification-terminating.
The reading that takes concern for the friend, like self-concern, to 
be justification-terminating is supported by Aristotle's description of 
one's relation to oneself as the paradigmatic case of friendship: 'one 
is a friend to himself most of all' (1168b9). Aristotle thinks that the defin­
ing features of friendships with others are derived from friendship with 
oneself, and takes as the central instance of this the desire one has for 
goods and apparent goods for one's ow n sake (1166al-5, 15-17). '[A]n 
extreme degree of friendship resembles one's friendship to oneself 
(1166bl; see also 1171b33). On this interpretation, friendships are not 
essentially instrum ental, any m ore than one's relation to oneself is 
merely or essentially instrum ental. Part of what it is for a tool to be 
(solely) a tool is that it is always used for something: there is always 
a reason extrinsic to the tool for w hat one does to and with it. This 
is precisely what justification-termination in the friend does not permit.6
W e have here two apparently distinct notions: that of wanting the 
good for one's friend for his own sake, and that of the friend's being 
another self. H ow are they related? One might think that the fact that 
one desires the good for one's friend for the friend's sake is constitu­
tive, perhaps exhaustively constitutive, of the friend's being another 
self: to say that the friend is another self is just to say that one desires 
the good for one's friend for his ow n sake.7 As a treatm ent of friend­
ship, I think this approach to have many merits; however, I doubt that 
it can be successfully im ported into Aristotle exegesis.
There are two reasons for thinking this. Recall that we are trying to 
take the Aristotelian locutions as seriously (and as literally) as possi­
ble. If the friend is another self, then what makes one's friend, one's 
friend, is the same thing that makes oneself, oneself. This can be main­
6 To be sure, there do appear to be instrumental uses of one's friends: Aristotle 
states (to translate as literally as possible) that 'many things are done just as through 
instruments also as through friends and political power' (1099blf), and that 'your 
friend, since he is another yourself, supplies what your own efforts cannot sup­
ply' (1169b6). But in the same, somewhat stilted way, one can make instrumen­
tal use of oneself (as in 'the movement of limbs that are the instruments' -  
1110al6). It is probably more appropriate to regard this kind of instrumentality 
as a sort of extended agency: 'what our friends achieve is, in a way, achieved 
through our agency, since the origin is in us' (1112b28). See note 3.
7 Jennifer Whiting presents such a view — although not as an interpretation of Aristo- 
tie — in 'Friends and Future Selves,' Philosophical Review 45 (1986), 547-80.
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tained together with the reading that takes other-self-dom  to be con­
stituted by special concern provided that one believes8 that one's own 
self is (at least partially) constituted by self-concern. But w hatever the 
merits of this position, it is implausibly attributed to Aristotle, whose 
account of w hat makes oneself, oneself, will be a far more m etaphysi­
cal story. This story is likely to have to do with species form and m at­
ter, and possibly with individual forms; the issue is controversial.9 In 
any case, it is very unlikely to have m uch to do with concern. That's 
one reason.
Here's the other. If 'one's friend is another self' and 'one desires the 
good for one's friend for his own sake' are just different ways of say­
ing the sam e thing (or if 'the friend is another self' merely abbreviates 
'one desires the good for one's friend for his ow n sake' and some other 
statements about other-self-dom ), then the fact that the friend is 
another self can no more cause, explain or justify one's desiring the 
good for one's friend for his own sake than synonym s can cause, ex­
plain or justify one another. Aristotle, however, thinks that the friend's 
being another self at least explains desiring the good for him for his 
own sake: 'The decent person, then, has each of these features (which 
include desiring goods for one's own sake) in relation to himself, and 
is related to his friend as he is to himself, since [gar] the friend is another 
self' (1166a30-32; cf. 1166a3, 15-17).
The suggestion that one desires the good for one's friend because he 
is another self10 raises anew the question of w here justification ter­
minates. There does seem  to be an answ er to the question 'W hy do 
what's good for your friend?' -  namely, that he is another self. 
However, the analogy betw een friendship and self-love is preserved  
if we hear such an answ er as spoken in the sam e tone of voice that 
the first-person question would elicit: 'I do what's good for me because 
I'm m yself.' And it m ay be that these explanations do not provide ad­
ditional justification -  in the sense of adducing a further end for which 
the explanandum  is an instrumental means — but rather explanation  
of another kind. At any rate, Aristotle seems to agree that we do desire 
the good for our own sakes because we are ourselves, although just
8 As does Whiting, ibid.
9 Cf. Edwin Hartman, Substance, Body and Soul (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Universi­
ty Press 1977) 10-56; Jennifer Whiting, 'Form and Individuation in Aristotle/ His­
tory of Philosophy Quarterly 3(1986), 359-77.
10 I'm not claiming that one desires the good for one's friend for his own sake only 
because he is another self. One might, for example, feel good will towards Mas­
ons, and so also to one's Masonic friends.
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w hat this com es to is a tricky question.11 This leaves us the tasks of 
elucidating the 'b ecau se/ and of saying w hat it is for the friend to be 
another self.
Ill
Elucidating the b ecause' m ust wait on elucidating other-self-dom, and 
to do this, a detour is necessary. The 'friendship of kindred and that 
of com panions' constitute a separate class, different from other kinds 
of friendship (1161b llf).12 Kinship-friendship is uniformly derivative 
from the love of parents for their children (1161bl6f), and important­
ly, parental love shares with com radely friendship the feature we are 
trying to understand: 'A parent loves his children as [he loves] him­
self. For what has come from him is a sort of other himself' (1161b27-30; 
cf. 1161bl8f). By transitivity of identity, as it were, brothers are 'iden-
11 Before mentioning the tricky question, a caveat: Actually, we desire apparent goods 
for our apparent selves, and the base, Aristotle recognizes, may, in addition to 
mistaking apparent goods for goods, mistake their apparent selves for their real 
selves, as when they try to 'gratify their appetites and in general their feelings 
and the non-rational parts of the soul' rather than reason (1168b20; cf. 
1168b30-1169a3). Moreover, the very base may not even desire goods for them­
selves at all -  partly because they find themselves unbearable, and partly be­
cause they may lack coherently organized personalities, i.e., full-fledged selves 
(1166b2-27). So, more precisely, when we desire the good for our own sakes, we 
do so because we are ourselves.
Now while Aristotle often enough seems to commit himself to the view that 
' we desire the good for our own sakes because we are ourselves, other remarks 
indicate that we desire the good for ourselves for our own sakes on account of 
our own virtue. These views need not be taken as contradicting one another if 
the latter can be taken as sketching the internal structure of the former. Such a 
construal would also be convenient for the line of exegesis I am advocating in 
another way, since I am about to argue that it is causing the friend's virtues that 
makes him my friend. My attempt to be literal about the 'another self' locution 
should then make me want to say that it is causing my own virtues that makes 
me myself; and the kind of account of the relation between one's virtues and one's 
selfhood I have in mind would allow me to say something sufficiently like this. 
Providing a full-fledged account of this kind would take me too far afield, so I 
will not do it here. However, I'll defend a more modest version of the claim in 
section V. ,
12 Aristotle seems to be contrasting companionly friendship with that of relatives 
and possibly with the political friendships of the immediately preceding passages, 
so I take the scope of 'companionly friendship' to be what we ordinarily take as 
friendship, with the proviso that Aristotle would have in mind genuine, i.e., virtue- 
friendship. , } . ,
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tical with each o th e r/ since they are identical with their parents. They 
are 'in a sense the sam e thing, although in separate individuals' 
(1161b30-35). Since kinship-friendship and companion-friendship be­
long together, and share the features that we are trying to explain, and 
since kinship-friendship derives from parental friendship, we m ay be 
able to understand companion-friendship by way of parental 
friendship.
One can abstract from the parent-child relation to a relation that we 
shall call procreation. If A is a procreator of B, then (i) A is a creator of 
B in the sense that A is causally responsible for B's being,13 and (ii) 
B has the sam e being that A does. Now before arguing that the friend- 
friend relation is an instance of the procreation relation, I will argue 
that procreation is well-suited to explain the link between other-self- 
dom and special concern.
Procreation — indeed, even its creation com ponent — seems to cause 
the kind of special concern we have been considering. '[EJveryone likes 
his own products more than (other people's), as parents and poets do' 
(1120bl3). In the parent-child case, this is especially clear: the parent 
comes to love his children as a causal consequence — perhaps even  
as a side-effect -  of their being his children. Craftsmen also have this 
preferential attitude tow ards their products (1167b34f; cf. 1168al-3). 
The procreative relation underlies the love of the benefactor for his 
beneficiary: 'the beneficiary is his product and hence he likes h im ...' 
(1168a4-6, my italics).
The explanation of this phenom enon is worth quoting in full:
1. Being is choice worthy and lovable for all.
2. We are insofar as we are actualized, since we are insofar as we live and act.
3. The product is, in a way, the producer in his actualization.
4. Hence the producer is fond of the product, because he loves his own being.
And this is natural, since what he is potentially is what the product indicates in
actualization. (1168a5-10)
So far, this explains both the parent's love for his children and the 
potter's preferential fondness for his own pots. The difference between  
these can be accounted for by our second condition on procreation: 
The producer loves his own being, and in procreation the creator has 
the same being as the creature. The potter is not himself a pot, so that
13 After comparing the relation between parents and children to that between gods 
and men, Aristotle brings to our attention the crucial fact that gods and parents 
are respectively 'the causes of [the] being' of men and children (1162a4-7). And 
at 1161al7 Aristotle describes the father as 'the cause of his children's being/
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pot and potter do not fully share the sam e being (except insofar as the 
pot is an actualization of the potter); but parent and child are both hu­
man beings, and share the (appropriate kind of) sam e being.
N ow I don't w ant to try to reconstruct here the metaphysics that 
makes this w ay of thinking about these things plausible to Aristotle; 
suffice it that Aristotle does find it plausible. (At Physics 202b5 he ex­
plicitly states that '[i]t is not absurd that the actualization of one thing 
should be in an o th er/ giving as example the actualization of the teach­
er in the student. Com pare Metaphysics 1058a28-32.) For now , let's just 
say that the creature is the procreator's 'other self' because the procre­
ator is responsible for the creature's having the being that they share, 
and it is natural for the procreator to have a special concern for his 
creature as an actualization of his being.
IV
The next item on our agenda is the claim that one is a procreator of 
one's friend. To be sure, one is not one's friend's procreator in the same 
w ay that a parent is his child's procreator: generally one's friends are 
living flesh and blood before they are one's friends. The force of the 
claim is rather that, over the course of a friendship, one becomes 
(causally) responsible for the friend's being w ho he is. N ow  Aristotle 
thinks that friendships are because of or for virtue. These positions 
coincide if virtue is (part of) w hat m akes the virtuous m an who he is. 
The being of a child for which his parent is causally responsible is, we 
can say, his human being; the being of one's friend for which one is 
responsible is his virtuous being. The former is, if you like, what he 
is; the latter is who he is.
This line of argum ent involves tw o subsidiary tasks. W e must con­
vince ourselves that Aristotle takes virtue to be (part of) w hat makes 
the virtuous m an who he is. (I'll defer this to section V.) And we should 
say som ething about the causal role that the virtuous m an plays in 
bringing about or maintaining his friend's virtue. A partial description 
can be appropriated from  Cooper, w ho provides the following account 
of Aristotle's 'argum ents to show  that friendship is an essential con­
stituent of a flourishing hum an life':
[F]irst...to know the goodness of one's life, which [Aristotle] reasonably assu m es 
to be a necessary condition of flourishing, one needs to have intimate friends whose 
lives are similarly good, since one is better able to reach a  sound and secure esti­
mate of the quality of a life when it is not one's own. Second,.. .the fu n d a m e n ta l 
moral and intellectual activities that go to make up a flourishing life cannot be 
continuously engaged in with pleasure and interest, as they must be if the life 
is to be a flourishing one, unless they are engaged in as parts of shared activities
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rather than pursued merely in private; and given the nature of the activities that 
are in question, this sharing is possible only with intimate friends who are them­
selves morally good persons.14
To paraphrase the suggestions as crudely as possible, one's friends 
serve as hum an mirrors in which one can better see one's own vir­
tue;15 and one's friends are the team m ates one needs to play the game 
of a virtuous life. I agree with Cooper that these are some of the ways
14 Cooper, 330f.
15 The phrase 'human mirror' is Cooper's, adapted from the Magna Moralia (MM).  
The 'human mirror' argument seems to me the more dubious of the two. First, 
in making it out Cooper draws heavily on the MM (1213al0-26), which should 
be used with caution when trying to establish the views of the NE. For even if, 
as some deny, the MM is authentic, it may represent a stage in the development 
of Aristotle's thought distinct from that of the NE. Cooper appears to regard the 
MM passage as a more straightforward form of the argument of NE 1169b27-1170a4 
and of 1170al5-b7. But it is not clear to me 1) that the two just-mentioned pas­
sages both contain the same argument or 2) that either NE passage contains the 
argument of the MM passage. Indeed, the contrast between the generally admit­
ted obscurity of the NE  passages and the relative clarity of the MM passage casts 
doubt on the claim.
Second, Cooper prefers his view to Ross's alternative construal of 
1169b27-1170a4, which he regards as circular. But it is not clear that the argu­
ment, properly understood, is circular. Cooper points out that, on Ross's con­
strual, 'Aristotle simply assumes, altogether without explicit warrant, that the 
good man will have friends' (318) -  and this is an inappropriate assumption in 
an argument for having friends. But Cooper conflates the project of demonstrat­
ing 'the value to a person of his having friends' (318), with the distinct project 
of providing someone who has no friends with reasons to acquire them. Were 
Aristotle's aim the latter, rather than that of explaining to the virtuous person 
why his friends are valuable, the argument would indeed be circular. But notice 
that the argument, construed in this way, renders friendship essentially instrumen­
tal: a friendship formed in order to attain the pleasure promised by the argument 
would be one of the friendship-analogs, rather than true friendship.
If, instead, part of being virtuous is contributing to the virtue of others, and 
if -  as we shall see -  this has as a causal consequence that the virtuous man 
acquires friends, then the alleged circularity disappears. For then it is simply a 
fact that the virtuous man does have friends. Raising the question of the value 
of these friends is in such a case not at all the same as asking for reasons to make 
friends. So Ross-like interpretations, which do not require excursions to the MM 
and are thus to be preferred, remain open.
Given the foregoing, one might wonder why I adopt the 'human mirror' story 
at all. The reason is that even if these views were not in the foreground when 
the NE was composed, Aristotle may still have had 'human mirrors' in mind when 
thinking of the ways in which friends affect each other's virtue. There are un­
doubtedly many ways in which this happens, and Aristotle need not have enumer­
ated in the NE all those he had discovered. For our purposes it suffices to supply 
plausibly Aristotelian examples of such causal relations.
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in which we influence our friends' virtue, although there are surely 
others; moral education is another prom inent possibility.16 This in­
fluence plays an im portant role in my account, but this role is causal 
rather than justificatory. Our current task is to elucidate the 'because' 
in 'One desires the friend's good for his own sake because he is another 
self'; we already know that the 'because' cannot represent a means- 
end relation, because friendships are essentially non-instrumental.17
16 Recall Physics 202b5, and see note 18 below.
17 When Cooper takes the function of these arguments to be that of 'defending] 
the value of friendship only by showing that for human beings it is a necessary 
means to attaining certain broadly valuable psychological benefits' (Cooper, 332, 
italics mine) he is providing an unsatisfactory, because (solely) instrumental, ac­
count of friendship. And, not incidentally, an account that cannot explain the 
non-interchangeability of friends. Cooper's position in 'Aristotle on Friendship' 
seems to me schizophrenic: he denies that he is producing an essentially in­
strumental account of friendship, and in the first part of the paper seems more 
or less successful; but the latter half produces what is, denials notwithstanding, 
just such an account. Since the two parts of the paper were originally separately 
published papers (see Cooper's note 1), there may be an historical explanation 
for the final version's split personality. I will confine myself here to explaining 
why the story that Cooper gives is in fact essentially instrumental.
Mirrors — even human mirrors — are tools used for a specified purpose; this 
is true despite Cooper's flat denial on p. 333. Those who cooperate with one in 
a shared activity are, on the account presented, instruments towards one's per­
formance of that activity. Cooper distinguishes between shared activities like chess, 
in which co-participants need have solely instrumental value, and shared virtu­
ous activities, which require intimate acquaintance in order to ascertain and ap­
prehend the co-participant's virtue; such intimate acquaintance is, Cooper thinks, 
sufficient for friendship. A similar line is taken regarding 'human mirrors.'
This is an interesting argument, but its links will not bear the strain that Coop­
er puts on them. For one thing, intimate acquaintance is by no means sufficient 
for friendship (as anyone who has ever shared his living quarters will testify). 
For another, ascertaining the virtue of another need not require intimate acquain­
tance. Virtues are something like dispositional psychological states. We can im­
agine that psychologists discover ways of reading these states off of a person's 
nervous system. They then build virtuometers, which quickly and reliably evaluate 
a person's virtue index. (If we want to make the story less anachronistic, we can 
imagine that the gods, who see into the souls of men, sponsor Virtue Evaluation 
Oracles in downtown Athens.) Under such circumstances it is very easy for vir­
tuous persons to find guaranteed-to-be-virtuous co-participants in virtuous ac­
tivities. But it would be unreasonable to describe such people — people like the 
stranger with whom I have agreed, on the basis of his 98.7 Composite Virtue In­
dex, to cooperate in building a temple -  as friends. Such devices could also, with 
a little more story-telling, be made to take the place of 'human mirrors'; instead 
of using one's friend to study one's own virtue, one could take virtuometer read­
ings. Stories like this one show that 'human mirrors' and co-participants in virtu­
ous activities are, qua occupiers of these roles, simply instrumental means to an
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So these considerations cannot be instrumental reasons for having 
friends. But w hat are they, if not instrumental reasons?
My suggestion is, causes. Let A and B be friends, and let B be (part­
ly) responsible for (at least the m aintenance of) A's virtue, in that B 
serves as a hum an mirror, and is a team -m ate in A's virtuous activi­
ties. Cooper takes these facts to provide A with (instrumental) reasons 
for befriending B. But Cooper has things backwards. The causal facts, 
rather than providing A  with instrumental reasons to befriend B, ex­
plain B's love for A. B loves A because he is a procreator of A, and procre­
ators love their creatures. These causal interactions make each friend 
the other's 'other self,' and bring about the love of the friend for his 
own sake. (In like m anner, the sym m etrical facts explain A's love for 
B; just as B is a procreator of A, so A is a procreator of B .)18
It might be objected that one assists one's friends in being virtuous 
because they already are one's friends; so that they cannot be one's 
friends because one assists them  in being virtuous. The appearance of 
circularity here can be dealt with by pointing out that the instances 
of assistance may be distinct: a present or future favor to a friend is 
prompted by his being a friend now; his being my friend now may be 
a result of past favors to one another's virtue. These in turn may have 
been prom pted by the friendship of a still earlier time. To this it might
end; they can be replaced by gadgets like virtuometers or by virtuometer-certified 
strangers because they are already no more than tools, and any tool, qua tool, 
is replaceable by anything else that serves the same purpose. Cooper's account, 
then, construes friends as essentially instruments, and as a fungible commodity.
18 A question that might be raised is whether my account can be extended to 'civic 
friendship' -  the somewhat weaker form of philia that is found between fellow- 
citizens. (Even if it cannot, this is not an objection to the account; for Aristotle 
thinks that 'we should set apart the friendship of families and that of compan­
ions' [1161bllf].) Now, the citizens of the Greek polls took one of its primary func­
tions to be that of educating its citizens. This education involved not merely the 
transmission of skills and information but a broader mission, involving the in­
culcation of virtues, that we can call the shaping of character. This widely shared 
opinion was also held by Aristotle. (Cf., e.g., 1099b29-32, 1102a7-10, 1103b2-7, 
1155a23, 1179b32-1180al5, 1180a35-b7.) If, as I have suggested, one's character, 
constituted at least partly by one's virtues, is at least part of what makes one who 
one is, then the polis is (partly) responsible for its citizens being who they are.
Of course the polis is not a person. To say that the polis is responsible for a per­
son's virtues and character is to say that the responsibility is shared by his fellow 
citizens who, with him, constitute the polis. Each of this person's fellow citizens 
is (in a small degree) responsible for his virtues, and thus (to a similar degree) 
for his being who he is. If so, then each citizen is a procreator of his fellow citizens, 
and this will lead him to exhibit (a suitably weak form of) love towards them. 
Civic friendship, it turns out, can also be understood as derivative from the rela­
tion between a procreator and his creature.
372 Elijah Millgram
be objected that a regress has been substituted for vicious circularity. 
But it need not be the case that all my actions that assist others in be­
ing virtuous be prom pted by prior friendship. Some may be due to 
spontaneous good will (1155b35ff, 1167a3-13; cf. 1156b26-30), and some 
m ay be the virtuous actions that one is bound to perform in the course 
of leading a virtuous life.
Let me review the merits of this account. It is explicitly non­
instrumental. It explains w hy one loves the particular virtuous people 
that one in fact does love, and in so doing, explains the numerical con­
straint Aristotle imposes on the size of one's circle of friends: while 
there are m any virtuous people, one is only causally responsible (in 
the appropriate w ay) for the virtue of a few. The self-perpetuating 
character of the causal relations explains the perm anence of friendship 
(cf. 1156bl8): virtuous friends assist one another in remaining virtu­
ous, and this mutual assistance keeps them  friends. While friends can 
be corrupted, and while long separation can sever the causal links 
(1157bl0-14), in general friends do not cease to be one another's procre­
ators.19 Finally, the account rules out the interchangeability and replace- 
ability of virtuous friends: A and B m ay be equally virtuous, but if one 
is causally responsible for A 's virtue but not for B's, then one will love 
A and not B.
V
The most im portant piece of unfinished business is the job of attribut­
ing to Aristotle the claim that virtue is (a part of) w hat makes the vir­
tuous man w ho he is. This claim deserves a paper unto itself, so I'm 
going to suffice with reviewing reasons for thinking that Aristotle did 
endorse it. The claim can be taken in two w ays, corresponding to a 
stronger and weaker way of understanding the expression 'who some­
one is.' The question 'W ho are you?' can prom pt on the one hand, an 
answer like, 'My nam e's Horatio A lger,' or 'I'm the president of Alger 
Enterprises,' and on the other, an answ er like 'I'm a Young Republi­
can ,' or T'm som eone w ho clawed his way up from poverty to the pin­
nacle of financial success.' That is, it can elicit a response that picks 
out the individual himself (by nam e or definite description) — this is 
w hat I am calling the strong sense — or it can elicit a certain kind of
19 And they do not -  barring the possibility that the corrupted friend has become 
another person (see note 22) — cease to have been one another's procreators. This 
may explain one's residual goodwill towards an (uncorrupted) ex-friend 
(1165b31-35). , , ,
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(characterization of the individual which does not necessarily apply only 
to him. There is strong textual support for the w eaker version, which 
is the version of the claim for which I shall argue.20 First, though, it 
is necessary to say som ething, how ever briefly, about the force of the 
weak version of the claim.
Clearly, not just any characterization of an individual will do as an 
answer to the question 'W ho are you?' Consider the examples just 
given: to answ er with one's party affiliation or with one's financial his­
tory is to indicate that one identifies oneself very strongly with one's 
political position or with the abilities and aspects of one's personality 
that brought one to the top of the heap. It is appropriate to answ er 
with traits that one believes to be central to one's character, the kind 
of traits that som eone who wants to be loved for him- or herself might 
regard as traits that it would be appropriate to be loved for. Of course, 
what one believes one's characteristic traits to be and w hat they in fact 
are may well be two very different stories. Still, who one is is largely 
a matter of one's character, and som e traits are more central to one's 
character than others. To claim that virtue is part of w hat makes the 
virtuous man who he is is to say that his virtues exhibit this kind of 
centrality relative to his character.
This is very m uch Aristotle's view. At 1156al0 , he says that '[tjhose  
who love each other for utility love not the other in himself'; and at 
line 17 that utility- and pleasure-friendships 'are coincidental, since the 
beloved is loved not in so far as he is who he is.' Utility- and pleasure- 
friendships are here being contrasted with virtue-friendships, so the 
implication is that those who love another for his virtue love him in 
himself, and that the virtue-beloved is loved insofar as he is who he 
is.21 If loving som eone for his virtues is loving him for who he is, then  
his virtues must be a large part of who he is.
We can com plem ent these inferences from contrasting cases with 
positive evidence. Good people, we are told, 'will be friends because 
of themselves, since they are friends insofar as they are good' (1157b2-3; 
compare 1156b8, 1157al7-20). More tenuously, 1171al9f (which speaks 
of being the friend of people 'for their virtue and for them selves') sug­
20 It may be possible to substantiate the claim on its second, stronger reading. While 
I won't attempt to do so here, it seems possible to defend the view that virtues 
are not merely characterizing but also individuating features, perhaps in the context 
of a reading that commits Aristotle to individual forms.
21 A similar implication is possibly carried by 1157al5, which describes friends for 
utility as persons who 'were never friends of each other, but of what was expe­
dient for them'; one who befriends another for his virtue is, we may suppose, 
a friend of the other. Cf. also 1164al0.
374  Elijah Millgram
gests that being som eone's friend for his virtue is the sam e thing as 
being his friend for himself. And at 1112a2-3 Aristotle states that our 
ethical decisions — w hich are either partly constitutive or sym ptom at­
ic of our virtues — make us the sort of persons w e are.
If virtues are a central part of who their possessor is, we should ex­
pect them  to be am ong the most stable of character traits; and this is 
how Aristotle regards them . Virtuous characters are stable (1100b 13-20, 
1167b5-10, 1156bl3), unlike those of the vicious, who 'do not even re­
main similar to w hat they w ere' (1159b9; cf. 1156a20). '[V]irtuous peo­
ple are enduringly [virtuous] in them selves, and enduring [friends] 
to each other' (1159b3f). Aristotle does admit that the virtuous can be­
com e corrupted (1165bl, 13ff). But his discussion of such cases sup­
ports the claim for which we are arguing. In justifying one's ceasing 
to associate with a once-virtuous but corrupted friend, Aristotle states 
that one 'w as not the friend of a person of this sort' (1165b22f). If los­
ing one's virtue makes one a different sort of person, then one's virtue 
is central to making one the kind of person one is, and is a character 
trait of the appropriate centrality.22
Earlier on w e said that Aristotle takes virtue-friendship to be the sole 
genuine form of friendship. W e can now explain why. While it is plau­
sible to think that I have causal effects on my pleasure- and utility- 
'friends,' and that I am responsible for maintaining certain features or 
properties of theirs (probably those features and properties that make 
them  pleasurable or useful to me), these properties and features — un­
like virtues — are not, on Aristotle's view, among those that make per­
sons (and in particular, my pleasure- and utility-'friends') who they 
are. Being virtuous is a large part of w hat it is to be a hum an being, 
whence of what it is to be the virtuous person that one is. On the other 
hand, being useful to me and being pleasant to me are not a part of 
being who one is .23 This is w hy, despite superficial similarities, virtu­
ous friendships turn out to be related to pleasure- and utility- 
'friendships' in m uch the w ay that ducks turn out to be related to toy 
ducks.
22 If one were to argue for the stronger version of the claim (see note 20, above), 
one might want to treat this case as one in which the corrupted friend has be­
come a different person, reading the passage against Aristotle's discussions of 
still-more-radical transformations that fail to preserve identity at 1159a9ff and 
1166a20-24.
23 This may not always be true if these descriptions are given a 'rigid reading': what 
makes someone useful to me may be his virtues. A non-rigid reading is intended.
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An additional strength of my view is that it allows us to reconcile Aristo­
tle's account of friendship with his com m itm ent to what Vlastos calls 
'the Eudaem onist Axiom ' (EA ), i.e ., with the claim that all one's ac­
tions are done for the sake of one's ow n eudaemonia (roughly, happi­
ness or well-living);24 and to do so without sacrificing the motivational 
plausibility of the EA . The difficulty is that the EA seem s to conflict 
with Aristotle's strongly held view that one desires the friend's good  
for his ow n sake. It suggests that while 'W hy do w hat's good for you?' 
maybe a non-question, the parallel question, i.e., 'W hy do what's good 
for your friend?' cannot be.
One response is to suggest that Aristotle's conception of eudaemonia 
is such as to reconcile the two claims. Eudaemonia is not to be under­
stood as restricted to a person's narrowly conceived interests; it is not, 
for instance, a hedonist's conception of happiness. Rather, it may in­
clude such things as the happiness of others. O n such a construal, I 
can desire the good for my friend for his own sake while adhering to 
the EA because m y friend's good is part of my own eudaemonia; 
whenever I act for my friend's sake I am also acting for my sake.25
While I do endorse this m ove, it is im portant to see why it must be 
made with caution. For it seem s to threaten the psychological plausi­
bility and motivational force of the EA. The claim that one does (and  
should) act for the sake of one's own eudaemonia loses m uch of its per­
suasive pow er w hen eudaemonia is construed not as something like the 
personal happiness in which an egoist would take a healthy interest 
but rather as a collection containing one's own (narrowly conceived) 
happiness, the (narrow ly conceived) happiness of others, and possi­
bly additional unrelated items. That is, while the conflict can be 
resolved by broadening one's reading of eudaemonia to include the eu­
daemonia of one's friends, if this leaves one's eudaemonia broader than  
oneself, the EA will be undercut.
The doctrine of the friend being another self resolves the difficulty 
by giving selfhood as broad a scope as eudaemonia. In the paradigm  
of the procreative relation, 'a parent is fond of his children because 
he regards them as som ething of himself' (1161bl8f). In a w ay, the re­
lation resembles that which one has to one's parts: '[A] person regards
VI
24 1102a3; 1140a27 is seen as supporting the claim that the eudaemonia in question 
is one's own.
25 This is, if I correctly understand him, Vlastos's view. (Personal communication 
and unpublished notes.)
w hat com es from  him as his own, as the ow ner regards his tooth or 
hair or anything' (1161b23f) — and, 'what is our own is pleasant' 
(1169b33). The eudaemonia of one's friends is part of one's own because, 
and in the sam e w ay that, one's friends are parts of oneself.
O ne might be troubled by the fact that this reading seem s to leave 
little room  for w hat we might w ant to call genuine altruism. There is 
truth in this, but the responsibility for our discomfort is Aristotle's. 
Aristotle's explanations of friendship are uniformly self-oriented: since 
'we are insofar as we are actualized,' loving one's own being involves 
loving the actualizations of one's own being (1168a5ff) — and these 
include one's friends.26
By w ay of a last w ord, perhaps I should point out that in attributing 
to Aristotle the account of friendship set forth in this paper I am -  
I hope not too uncharitably — ascribing to him opinions that I myself 
would not care to endorse. It seem s to me that self-love is playing too 
great, and the w rong kind of, a role. As Robert Frost puts it in his poem, 
'Hyla Brook': 'W e love the things we love for w hat they are' — not for 
w hat w e have m ade them .27
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26 This reconciliation of Aristotle's theory of friendship with his eudaemonism may 
help to resolve an ambiguity I have been leaving open. We said that the procrea­
tor has the same being as his creature; and this is likely to prompt the reader 
familiar with Aristotle to ask wrhether the being they share is species being or 
individual being, i.e., whether the procreator and his creature are the same in 
kind or the same in number. Our discussion suggests that the more strongly one 
reads eudaemonism as a form of psychological egoism, the more one will be moti­
vated to adopt the latter construal. Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Aristotle the saying 
that friends are 'one soul inhabiting two bodies' (V.20); on such a reading, this 
would literally be Aristotle's view.
27 It has occurred to me that Frost may have had Aristotle's views of friendship 
in mind when he wrote this poem. Frost would have shared the exegetical or­
thodoxy of his time in taking Aristotle to hold that things of a kind have their 
form in common but are individuated by their matter. Virtues are specified by 
the form: if brooks had forms, a brook's virtues might include being full of clear, 
flowing water. Frost seems to be saying that he loves Hyla Brook not for its brookish 
virtues (which it possesses scantily, if at all) but for the matter that makes it differ 
from other brooks: its dried mud and dead leaves. What we love is not the form, 
and the virtues specified by it, but the individuating matter (hule). (The pun on 
hyla and hule has been thought of by others — e.g., Richard Rorty, Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1979], 40, 45, 
64f — and it is not extravagant to suppose that it may have occurred to Frost as 
well.) ,
